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and JAMES M. LUTZ
The USA Patriot Act is an acronym for the Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appro-
priate Tools to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
Act of 2001. It was passed by overwhelming
majority votes in both the House of Represen-
tatives (357 in favor to 66 against) and the Senate
(98 in favor to only 1 against) and signed into
law by President George W. Bush on October
26, 2001, only six weeks after the September 11
attacks on the World Trade Center towers and
the Pentagon. The Act was designed to strengthen
the counter-terrorism capabilities of the United
States and to prevent further attacks. The lengthy
and somewhat clumsy title was designed to gen-
erate supportive public opinion. The Act itself
is a wide-ranging piece of legislation, over 300
pages in length, and it is based upon a draft pro-
posed by the Department of Justice. Its stated
aim is “to deter and punish terrorist acts in the
United States and the world” (USA PATRIOT
ACT 2001, PL 107–56). To that end, the Patriot
Act strengthened existing statutes against money
laundering, reduced restrictions on the use of
surveillance and other investigatory tools for law
enforcement and intelligence-gathering, broad-
ened the grounds under which foreign nationals
can be detained or excluded, redefined terror-
ism, and enhanced the penalties for engaging in
such activities. These statutory measures, cou-
pled with the Act’s quick passage and its length,
have attracted intense criticism. Critics charge
that Congress, under extraordinary pressure from
the Bush administration and given the perceived
necessity for some action in response to 9/11,
acted too quickly, with little debate and without
considering all the details of the legislation. As
a consequence, the Act’s provisions often violate
civil liberties and ignore the system of checks
and balances the Framers of the Constitution so
carefully constructed (Cole and Dempsey 2002:
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195–196). Supporters point to national secu-
rity concerns and contend that Congress did not
make sweeping changes in the existing law, but
only modest ones, allowing, for example, the use
of investigatory and surveillance tools that were
already being utilized for fighting organized crime
and drug trafficking (Department of Justice ca.
2001: 1).
Some of the notable provisions of the Act that
have drawn the least fire from critics are the ones
against money laundering (Cole and Dempsey
2002: 195). Designed to better detect, deter, and
stop the financing of terrorism, these provisions
also reflect pre-9/11 worries about the weak-
ness of existing anti-money laundering statutes.
Accordingly, the Patriot Act specifically requires
financial institutions to establish and implement
anti-money laundering programs; moreover, it
specifically bans, with narrow exceptions, foreign
shell banks (banks that do not have a physical
presence in the United States). Such banks, which
are not subject to regulation, are perceived as
more likely to be conduits for mostly terrorist-
related money laundering. Other significant pro-
visions require financial institutions to verify the
identity of a customer, to check him or her against
a list of suspected or known terrorists, and to file
suspicious activity reports (SARs), which alert
the Treasury Department about unusual finan-
cial transactions (USA PATRIOT ACT 2001, PL
107–56, Title III). The Patriot Act also expands
the authority of existing agencies to freeze the
assets of suspected individuals or groups. In the
past sanctions could be applied if the individuals
or groups received a special designation. Now
assets can be frozen without that designation, in
“aid of an investigation” to prevent the flight of
assets or other negative actions (Eckhart 2008:
217). As a consequence of the emphasis on finan-
cial transfers, filings of suspicious activity reports
from financial institutions have greatly increased.
While more reports have been filed, fewer than 1%
of them have involved any possibility of terrorist
financing (Eckhart 2008: 219). Finally, the Patriot
Act broadened the crime of money laundering.
Money laundering now includes amongst other
financial transaction schemes the laundering of
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funds linked to foreign crimes of violence and
political corruption and the crime of provid-
ing material support to a terrorist organization.
Under the Act it is also a crime to run an
unlicensed money transmission business. This
provision reflects the concern of police and intel-
ligence agencies that small, owner-operated busi-
nesses are more likely to be conduits for terrorist
activity (USA PATRIOT ACT 2001, PL 107–56,
Title III). This last provision is one that has come
under fire. Its critics argue that it is through
such businesses that immigrant workers are able
to send money back to relatives, thus helping
not only their families, but the economies of less
developed countries. Closing off such means for
transferring money internationally creates hard-
ships for many foreign workers, especially since
conventional mechanisms for money transfers
are not available for small sums, or are too costly.
Critics also note that there is little evidence to sup-
port the idea that these businesses are linked to
terrorist groups or activities. In fact, they charge
that there is now evidence to suggest that it is the
large traditional financial institutions that are the
channels for such activity (D’Estree and Busby
2005).
The money laundering provision is not the only
portion of the Patriot Act that is related to immi-
grants. An entire section of the Act is devoted to
border security, which concerns foreign nationals.
Amongst the provisions are ones that expand the
number of government personnel stationed along
the US–Canadian border and provide for the
tracking of foreign students in the United States:
both these areas are deemed to be of special con-
cern for terrorist activity. The most controversial
provisions center on the exclusion, deportation,
or detention of foreign nationals with terrorist
ties. Specifically, these provisions exclude or per-
mit the deportation of aliens who engage in or
support terrorist activity. The provisions go fur-
ther, to permit the exclusion or deportation of
individuals who are members of, or support, a
group whose endorsement of terrorism under-
mines US efforts to stop the violence generated
by it. They also authorize the exclusion of foreign
nationals who use their prominence to endorse
terrorism or to persuade others to support ter-
rorism, and thus undermine US anti-terrorism
efforts (USA PATRIOT ACT 2001, PL 107–56,
Title IV). Critics charge that, in effect, these pro-
visions are a return to the Cold War approach
to ideological exclusion, an approach repealed by
Congress in 1990 and at odds with basic constitu-
tional principles. The one provision, opponents
contend, imposes guilt by association (ACLU
2009: 26–7), while the other denies entry on the
basis of speech rather than conduct. The deten-
tions or other actions taken against suspected
individuals are based on ethnicity, religion, or
national identity rather than on individual activ-
ities (Joyner 2004: 244). The detention provision
permits the detention of a foreign national cer-
tified by the Attorney General as a suspected
terrorist. The basis for such certification is that
the Attorney General has “reasonable grounds
to believe” that the immigrant in question has
or may have engaged in terrorist activity or is
a threat to national security. The Attorney Gen-
eral must then charge the foreign national with
a criminal or immigration violation, including
ones unrelated to terrorism, or release the immi-
grant. Critics contend that the detention powers
granted to the Attorney General are far too expan-
sive, and they point out what they perceive as
defects. First, they argue that “reasonable suspi-
cion” (rather than “probable cause”) as a basis
for detention is too low a requirement – too easy
to meet. Second, the immigrant has no right to
review the government’s evidence or to rebut it in
a hearing, contesting the certification. Rather, the
only avenue available for the immigrant is to file
a habeas corpus petition after being detained.
Finally, the Act allows for the possibility of
indefinite detention of individuals suspected of
terrorism if their country of origin will not accept
their return (Cole and Dempsey 2002: 201–205).
The Patriot Act provisions perhaps most
intensely subjected to debate are those that
expand the surveillance and search authority,
including the sharing of information amongst
intelligence and law enforcement agencies.
Responding to arguments that the technological
sophistication of terrorist groups requires
flexibility in wiretap authority (Department of
Justice ca. 2001: 1), the Act provides for roving
wiretaps that cover multiple devices. These roving
wiretaps allow for continuous interception of
communications, even though, for example,
terrorist suspects frequently change cell phones,
use different public access computers, or call from
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phone lines in various homes (USA PATRIOT
ACT 2001, PL 107–56, Title II, Section 206).
Critics charge that these wiretaps are different
from previous roving wiretaps used in criminal
investigations: they are more likely to intercept
the communications of innocent persons,
thus violating their privacy rights (Abramson
and Godoy 2006). The Patriot Act does not
require that the surveillance target be specifically
identified, nor is it necessary to indicate what
device is going to be tapped (ACLU 2009: 14).
Concerns over privacy underlie the debate
over the “record” and “national security letters”
provision of the Patriot Act. The records provi-
sions allows intelligence investigators to secretly
demand “any tangible thing,” including not only
business records but also books, documents, and
other papers, so long as the items are connected
with a terror investigation (USA PATRIOT ACT
2001, PL 107–56, Title II, Section 215). Critics
note that this provision greatly expands the range
of materials that can be obtained. Prior law only
allowed authorities access to business records
from motels, hotels, storage facilities, and car and
truck rental agencies (Ramasastry 2005). This
provision is commonly called the “libraries pro-
vision,” because library associations have argued
that this provision could be used to obtain the
reading records of patrons, in violation of their
First Amendment rights (American Library Asso-
ciation 2005). The Act also permits intelligence
agencies to access education records at college
and universities. Critics fear that this possibility
might lead students to avoid joining in dissent or
protest activities, for fear that other information
might become available to others (Joyner 2004:
247). Such a fear could lead to a diminution of
freedom of speech for some individuals. In con-
junction with the records provision, the national
securities letters (NSLs) provision authorizes the
expanded use of these instruments or special
demands for financial records, credit reports, and
telephone, email, and internet usage (these are
transactional records, not content records), which
do not require court approval. Both the records
provision and national security letters provision
allow access even if the records pertain to a per-
son who is not under suspicion of involvement
in terrorist activity (Cole and Dempsey 2002:
214–215).
The last two hotly debated investigatory pro-
visions, which pit privacy rights against national
security concerns, are the “sneak and peek”
searches and information-sharing provisions.
The sneak and peek provision allows searches
of homes without providing the owners with
an immediate notice of the search. Moreover,
investigators may enter the home even without
the occupants being present (USA PATRIOT
ACT 2001, PL 107–56, Title II, Section 213).
Critics note that sneak and peek searches have
only been previously allowed when someone’s life
was in danger, or evidence would be destroyed.
The information-sharing provision encourages
the sharing of criminal investigative findings,
such as grand jury information, with intelligence
agencies when the information involves foreign
intelligence; however, critics charge that there is
no judicial oversight and that the information
sharing should be limited to specific cases
involving terrorist activity (Cole and Dempsey
2002: 209–114).
Finally and importantly, the Patriot Act alters
the legal definition of terrorism. Under previ-
ous law terrorism was confined to acts “backed
by a foreign power.” As a consequence of the
September 11 attacks initiated by al-Qaeda, the
new definition of terrorism is expanded to include
non-state actors and “lone wolf” attacks. Terror-
ist attacks against mass transit systems, as well as
the use of biological weapons and the hacking of
computers, are outlawed. The definition is also
expanded to include domestic terrorism (USA
PATRIOT ACT 2001, PL 107–56, Title VIII).
This definition is more in keeping with definitions
of terrorism used elsewhere in the government,
which would identify terrorism as violence pursu-
ing political objectives and intended to influence
an audience. Such definitions also include the idea
that the terrorist individual or group is not a state.
While the definition recognizes different kinds of
terrorism, the inclusion of the definition within
the Patriot Act has implications for governmental
efforts to deal with possible attacks. The inclusion
of domestic terrorism within the purview of the
Act makes some sense from the perspective of
efforts to combat all kinds of terrorism, but it
also means that many of the provisions of the
Patriot Act designed to deal with foreign citizens
plotting against the United States can also be
used against US citizens suspected of terrorism.
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Critics have charged that the domestic terrorism
description can be so broadly interpreted that it
might include some political protests and forms
of civil disobedience (Joyner 2004: 245). Lastly,
one of the most controversial provisions of the
Act alters the existing prohibition against provid-
ing “material support” for terrorism to make it
include the giving of “expert advice or assistance,”
an alteration that, critics contend, chills the rights
of free speech protected by the First Amendment
(ACLU 2009: 24).
Since the Act was passed in 2001, many of
its most controversial provisions have been chal-
lenged in court and targeted for revision, repeal, or
non-reauthorization. The first and only challenge
to reach the Supreme Court involved prohibitions
against providing “expert advice or assistance” to
terrorist organizations. Those bringing the chal-
lenge wanted to advise groups that have been
designated as terrorist organizations under US
law and to train them in how to use inter-
national law in peace negotiations and how to
petition the United Nations for assistance. While
the Supreme Court recognized that the provi-
sion infringed freedom of speech, it held that
the government’s interest in combating terror-
ism outweighed any First Amendment rights,
even when the assistance provided to the terrorist
organizations is advocating nonviolent means of
redress for grievances rather than violent ones
(Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project 2010). In
addition, in response to criticism, Congress made
some modifications to the “records” and national
security letters provisions that established more
congressional and judicial oversight (Yeh and
Doyle 2006). Despite the continued criticism of
the Act, Congress enacted and President Obama
signed legislation renewing the few Patriot Act
provisions that were not permanent – the records
and rolling wiretap provisions – for another four
years (Abrams 2011).
The USA Patriot Act has been controversial
in many of its provisions. Some of those provi-
sions are under challenge in courts, but to date
there have been no definitive rulings overturn-
ing portions of the Act, since only one challenge
has reached the Supreme Court. The passage of
the Act reflects a long-established cyclical pat-
tern in US law and politics. In times of stress
and national security uncertainty, Congress sup-
ports measures, often initiated by the executive
branch, which have the effect of resetting the bal-
ance between liberty and security to favor security
interests. This tension between liberty and secu-
rity also surges in wartime, and the fact that the
struggle with al-Qaeda in the aftermath of the
attacks of September 11 was viewed in the context
of a global war on terrorism has strengthened
the emphasis on security at the expense of liberty
and has led to greater latitude on the part of the
executive branch in dealing with suspected ter-
rorists (Sederberg 2003). This combination of war
analogy and congressional support for defensive
measures has enhanced the authority of the exec-
utive branch at the expense of the authority of the
judicial branch. This happened in the past when
there were threats to national security. In the past,
when the crisis or security threat was perceived
to have abated, the judiciary normally reasserted
its role as protector of civil liberties, reestablish-
ing the prior equilibrium (or something close
to it). The global war on terrorism, which con-
tinues because (and as long as) the threat from
terrorism continues, tests not only the resilience
of this pattern and the place of Congress in a
wartime scheme of checks and balances, but also
the role and institutional capacity of the judiciary
as a political actor in an increasingly globalized
environment.
SEE ALSO: Civil Liberties; Money Laundering;
Politics and Crime Policy; Terrorism, Domestic;
Terrorism, International; Transnational Orga-
nized Crime.
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